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1INTRODUCTION
General Problem
—Early studies in perception fell within what
has come to be known as the tradition of stimulus determination.
This is the view that the external stimulus determines the percep-
tion. The emphasis was on a detailed analysis of the characteris-
tics of the external stimulus and the search was for comprehensive
laws relating the physical environment on the one hand and the
subjective experience on the other. The early work started with
the object and went to the person, and it generally asked the
question: ,,What does the environment do to the perceiver?"
Both Allport (1955) and Ittelson and Kutash (1961) point out,
however, that in the past decade or so this approach in perceptual
research has in part been reversed. Many contemporary investi-
gators conceptualize the perceptual process as starting with the
person and working toward the object. They generally ask the
question: "What does the perceiver do to the environment?" The
shift, then, is from considering perception as a passive reaction
to external events toward considering perceiving as a process
actively carried out by the perceiver.
Directive-State theory, as described by Allport (1955),
postulates that such conative phenomena as needs, tensions,
values
,
defenses and emotions, as well as the individual* s past
experience, are important determinants of perception; and that
research techniques must treat them as bonafide independent vari-
ables rather than neglect them or attempt merely to control them
as the earlier "formal" theories of perception did. There is a
considerable amount of experimental support for this position.
Factors such as bodily needs, reward and punishment associated
with the perceiving of objects, values characteristic of the in-
dividual, the value of objects to the individual, personality
characteristics of the perceiver, and emotionally disturbing
significates of stimuli have all been established as important
determinants of perception (Allport, 1955, pp. 309-319).
Also concerned with the inner determinants of perception is
the theory of Transactional-Functionalism (Allport, 1955;
Ittelson, 1952; Ittelson and Kutash, 1961; Kilpatrick, 1952,
1961). This position holds that the process of perception in-
volves a dynamic transaction between the perceiver and the per-
ceived, or, stated differently, between the organism and the
environment. In this transactional process the perceiver responds
to cues in his environment on the basis of unconscious assumptions
that he holds about the environment which have developed out of
his past experiences. These assumptions, whether true or false
for the immediate circumstances, constitute the basis for the
present percept. In Allport*s words, "As the organism assumes,
so it will perceive" (1955, p. 279).
From the standpoint of Transactional-Functionalism perception
is purposive; it is the process by which an individual attributes
to his environment the significances which he has found from
previous circumstances to have furthered or obstructed his pur-
poses. The purposes involved include those stensing from
the
values and goals that the individual acquires in
social relation-
ships with various reference groups in his environment. Again,
according to Ailport, "The process of living can be construed as
the achieving of the individual's values through the physical and
social environment via action and the perceptual process" (1955.
p. 280).
This theory has produced considerable research done mainly
by the late Adelbert Ames and his students (Ames, 1955; Ittelson,
1952; Kilpatrick, 1952, 1961). By using various experimental
arrangements such as the ‘'distorted room", a rotating trapezoidal
window, and aniseikonic glasses (Kilpatrick, 1952), these writers
have clearly demonstrated that the individual^ assumptions about
the nature of the object tend to shape his perceptions even when
these assumptions are quite incongruent with the proximal stimu-
lation pattern resulting from the object. They have also shown
that these assumptions, which operate immediately and unconsciously,
are very tenacious and may often persist when the person "knows"
(through investigation) the true state of affairs and realizes
that it does not justify the perception to which his assumptions
lead. The Transactional-Functionalist position is especially
relevant to this study both because it concerns itself chiefly
with the inner determinants of perception, and also because the
apparatus used was developed as a result of researches based on
this theory.
Ittelson and Slack (1958) apply the Transactional point of
view to the perception of people as visual objects. They emphasize
two groups of characteristics which they believe to be particularly
4important for our understanding of the visual perception of people:
familiarity and emotional loading. They further state that these
two characteristics might be called object familiarity and object
cathexis, except that it is incorrect to imply that they are
properties of objects alone. Neither, however, are they purely
properties of the individual. According to these authors, "Both
the object and the subject are necessary for the definition of
these characteristics in any concrete case, for they are character-
istics of the relationship (transaction)* which exists between sub-
ject aod object" (1958, p. 215). This is not to say that these two
factors do not enter into all object perception, but rather that
they operate significantly in the visual perception of people who
are real and important to us.
As regards object perception in general, the effects of these
two factors have been established in various experimental arrange-
ments. For example, in studying recognition thresholds with the
tachistoscope
,
both Howes and Solomon (1951) and Solomon and
Postman (1952) demonstrated a relationship between frequency of
prior usage (familiarity) and decreased recognition thresholds for
verbal stimuli. Also, in studying the effects of object value
(cathexis) and estimation of object size, a number of studies have
demonstrated differential size perception as a function of differ-
ential object value (Bruner and Goodman, 1947; Bruner and Postman,
1948; Lambert, Solomon and Watson, 1949; Ashley, Harper and Runyon,
1951; Beams and Thompson, 1952; Gilchrist and Nesberg, 1952). The
* Parenthesis mine.
objects of perception in these studies included coins, pokerchips,
and photographic images of articles of food, etc. The general
finding running through these studies is that valued objects tend
to be overestimated in size, and that generally the overestimation
vstics directly with the amount of value the object has for the
perceiver
•
Studies involving the perception of persons in which the sub-
ject wears aniseikonic lenses have produced results in line with
Xttelson and Slack's statement concerning the importance of
familiarity, and especially emotional loading, in this realm of
interpersonal behavior (Wittreich, 1953; Wittreich, 1955; Wittreich
and Radcliffe, 1956). These three studies suggest that, when an
«* m -r
observer views another person through aniseikonic lenses, the
perceived distortion is inversely related to the significance of
the relationship between the two persons.
Engel (1955, 1956a, 1956b) has studied person perception under
conditions of binocular rivalry. With the use of a stereoscope
the subject is presented with a different image to each eye, and
the perceptual integration, which may be one of a number of
different general effects, is noted. Employing such stimulus
arrangements as two male faces, a male and a female face, upright
and inverted faces, and face-genital combinations, Engel has shown
that the resolution of the binocular stimulus rivalries depends
both on familiarity and emotional loading. The general effect is
not so clear cut here, however, and the relative influence of
familiarity and/or emotional loading appears to differ with the
various stimulus arrangements
Another device used by the Ames group is the Thereness-
Thatness apparatus (Kilpatrick, 1952, 1961). The name derives
from the object quality-distance judgment relationship; e.g.,
that the estimation of the distance of a stationary object (ball)
depends upon what class of object (ping-pong ball, tennis ball,
etc.) it is assumed to be. With this apparatus it is possible to
study the effect of emotional loading on the distance at which an
object is perceived, and it has been used in a number of studies
on person perception with photographs of self and others as the
test stimuli. A reduced-cue situation is employed here to show
the effects of emotional loading on size-distance perception by
reducing insofar as possible all such external monocular cues to
size-distance variability as object size, linear perspective,
interposition, serial perspective, shadows and movement. The
important distance cue of binocular disparity is also eliminated
with respect to perception of the test stimulus. The subject is
confronted with two visual fields which are separated by a parti-
tion. One field is seen monocularly, the other binocularly. In
the binocular field there are a number of distance markers
situated at different positions along the depth of the field.
The perceptual (test) stimulus is presented in the monocular
field, which is devoid of distance cues as described above, and
the subject attempts to align it with the designated marker in
the binocular field by means of a lever or wheel which changes
its position or size (apparent position) • Although the subject
W
*
performs this readily, he is unaware of the fact (a) that he is
performing the feat of projecting a subjective estimate of the
actual size of the stimulus object, (b) that he is making his
distance settings on the basis of this projected or assumed size,
and (c) that the experimenter from his distance settings can make
Inferences concerning this projected size and thus of such
characteristics of the stimulus object as its familiarity and
emotional loading (Ittelson and Slack, 1958, p. 225).
Smith (1953, 1954) did two interesting experiments with this
technique which demonstrated a relationship between size-distance
perception of human faces (photographs) and the emotional meanings
attached to the faces. Using the Thereness-Thatness apparatus, he
studied the settings of pleasant and unpleasant faces. In both
cases he found that pleasant or less threatening faces tended to
be set larger than did unpleasant or more threatening faces. The
stimuli in Smith's studies were projected onto a screen in the
right visual field by means of a Clason projector. This device
makes it possible to change the size of an image while holding
focus constant. Since in the Thereness-Thatness apparatus a change
in stimulus size appears as a change in stimulus distance, the
statement that the pleasant faces were set larger is equivalent
to saying that these faces were set closer than the unpleasant
face8 were.
In the first study (1953) he had subjects set photographs of
faces taken from the Frois-Wittmann (1930) series which depicted
expressions of happiness (pleasant) and rage (unpleasant). The
photographs were accompanied by verbal descriptions of the
depicted expressions in order to heighten the emotional tone
produced by each photograph. When the appropriate descriptions
accompanied each photograph, the pleasant faces were set larger
than the unpleasant ones. When the verbal accompaniments were
reversed, that is, pleasant accompaniment with unpleasant face
and unpleasant accompaniment with pleasant face, the unpleasant
faces were set slightly larger than the pleasant ones were.
This suggests that the emotional tone produced by the accompanying
information helped to heighten or mitigate the general effect
depending on the agreement or disagreement between the infor-
mation and the expression in the photograph.
In his discussion Smith suggested that the explicit responses
were a function of implicit conditions within the subjects which
formed a frame of reference for evaluating the faces. Smith's
general conclusion is that the subjects responded to the meaning
which the faces elicited in the situation; and that this meaning
emerged out of the assumptions, attitudes, expectations, purposes
and special sensitizations which the subjects had acquired through
experience. Moreover, such meaning tends to occur with implicit
reference to the self-concept of the individual. The shifts in
the settings which occurred when the experimenter altered the
verbal descriptions shows that perception of the closeness of a
human face literally changed before the eyes of the subjects as
a function of alterations in their beliefs, assumptions and
expectations.
In a second experiment Smith (1954) studied this same
phenomenon in connection with two test measures of personality
adjustment and security. Using an adaptation of the Thereness-
Thatness apparatus, he asked subjects to merely locate pleasant
and unpleasant faces (same as in the previous study) with respect
to themselves, i.e., to vary the distance of the picture from
themselves until they were most comfortable. After this, the
subjects were given the Bell (1934) Adjustment Inventory, Student
Form and the Knutson (1948) Personal Security Inventory. It was
found that subjects with high scores on both tests tended to set
both pleasant and unpleasant faces larger and thua—in terms of
the Therene88~Thatnes8 illusion—closer to themselves than did
subjects with low scores. According to Smith, this serves to
illustrate the continuous pressure of inner securities and
adjustmental tendencies on the sort of personal distances which
are spontaneously established by a person between himself and
others.
A number of more recent studies done at the Veteran's
Administration Hospital, East Orange, New Jersey have also
employed this apparatus in studying person perception. Ittelson
and Slack (1958) used it for studying children as they view
their own photographs and those of other children. Although no
consistent trend as a function of age was found, these authors
did notice a slight but consistent tendency for subjects of all
age groups to set the self picture differently from pictures of
other children. Brophy and Walder (1961) had normal subjects
It)
set their own photographs as well as those of strangers. In all
cases the self picture was set consistently differently from that
of the stranger. Ittelson, Hoch and Kaufer (1961), working with
patients in a group therapy situation, had each patient in the
group make settings of a photograph of the following persons: (a)
the member of the group whom he liked best as judged by the co-
therapists, (b) the member he liked least, (c) the two therapists
and (d) himself. Significantly different settings were obtained
between the self and the least liked, between the most liked and
the least liked, and between one therapist and the least liked.
Wilner (1961) took sociometric measures on ward patients. Each
patient subsequently made settings of photographs of himself and
other patients selected on the basis of the sociometric data.
Preliminary results again show significantly different effects
for the self picture, and they suggest that both highly disliked
and highly liked persons are equivalent on this task and both are
set differently from relatively neutral persons. As Ittelson and
Slack note, a general conclusion can be drawn from the above
studies. This conclusion is that the apparent metric properties
of photographs of persons, as measured in this experimental
situation, are influenced by the affective relationship between
the subject and the person photographed (Ittelson and Slack, 1958,
p. 226).
The Thereness-Thatness apparatus has also been used to
investigate perceptual tendencies as a function of general person-
ality orientations. Kaufer (1961) screened male subjects according
to Homey* s (1945) trichotomous classification of personality
orientations. This classification differentiates people on
the basis of their general tendencies to "move
-toward"
,
"move-
against", and "move-avay" in interpersonal relationships. In
this study the subjects personality orientations were determined
with respect to both men and women. In the perceptual task on
the Thereness-Thatness apparatus the subjects were required to
make size-distance settings on each of six objects: a three-
quarter sized playing card, a cube, a male figure, a female
figure, a male genital symbol and a female genital symbol.
Kaufer concluded that general personality orientation is
significantly related to performance on the Thereness-Thatness
apparatus. His principal finding was that subjects with a
"moving-toward" orientation tended to place objects further
away when attempting to align them with a specified marker than
did subjects with a "moving-away" orientation. In terms of the
Thereness-Thatness demonstration this means that the "moving-
toward" subjects tended to see the objects as larger and closer
than did the "moving-away" people. For the population of this
study, this effect was significant for the personality orienta-
tion in relation to men, but not in relation to women.
This investigation also employed the Thereness-Thatness
apparatus in studying the relationship between a basic personality
orientation and size-distance perception. More specifically,
perception of relevant others was studied in connection with
different levels of individually reported self-ideal discrepancy.
The min experimental question to be answered was: How does a
discrepancy between the way a person feels he la and the way he
would Uke to be affect his site-distance perception of other
people who are relevant to his self-ideal discrepancy.
In personality theory the concept of the "ideal self" is
commonly considered as fundamental to an understanding of human
behavior. Psychoanalytic theory describes the ego-ideal as being
an important aspect of the super-ego, functioning both as a basic
source of motivation and also as a determinant of psychical
pleasure and pain (Fenichel, 1945; Freud, 1927). According to
psychoanalytic point of view, such conditions as guilt and loss
of self-esteem can result from a failure on the part of the ego
to live up to the demands of the "ego-ideal". In reference to
this important psychical agency Freud stated, "From analysis of
the delusion of observation we have come to the conclusion that
in the ego there exists a faculty that Incessantly watches,
criticizes and compares, and in this way is set against the other
part of the ego. In our opinion, therefore, the patient perceives
within his ego the rule of a faculty which measures his actual
ego and all his activities by an "ego-ideal" which he has created
for himself in the course of his development" (Freud, 1935,
p. 371). Karen Horney (1937, 1945, 1950) made this concept
central to her theory of personality, and she described the
basic neurotic conflict as involving a repudiation of the real
self in the interest of realizing the prideful and arrogant ideal
13
self. Carl Rogers (1951, 1954, 1959) employs this concept in
his theory of personality and in his "Client-Centered" approach
to psychotherapy. Rogers sees the basic source of emotional
maladjustment as residing in a contradiction between expectations
and actual experiences. This unfortunate state of affairs is
largely determined by an inner discrepancy between the individual^
felt self, which reflects what he actually is, and his ideal self,
which dictates with varying degrees of urgency what he would like
to be. According to Rogers, in successful psychotherapy this
painful endo-psychic gap is closed so that the felt self and the
ideal self are able to exist in closer harmony with one another.
In all three of the above theories the ideal self, or ego-
ideal in psychoanalytic terminology, is conceptualized as an
important endo-psychic seat of values, goals and aspirations which
continually calls upon the adaptive efforts of the total personal-
ity for attention and fulfillment. Put differently, it may be
viewed as a source of tensions within the personality which
necessitates the development of tension-reducing adjustive and/or
defensive techniques. In the case of high self-ideal discrepancy
in which these tensions are excessive, or at least relatively so
compared to the condition of low self-ideal discrepancy, it seems
logical to infer that the adjustive and/or defensive needs of the
individual should be proportionately more intense. Since it has
been documented earlier that perception is affected by internal as
well as external factors (Allport, 1955), it can further be in-
ferred from the above model that the perceptual processes of the
dividual will be affected by the magnitude of his self-ideal
discrepancy as this interacts with and calls upon his adjustive
and defensive techniques. In the language of Transactional-
Functionalism. the conditions of high self-ideal discrepancy, as
compared to low self-ideal discrepancy, may contribute to different
assumptions about the self and the environment which may in turn
mediate different perceptions of relevant persons, objects and
events.
Thus far an attempt has been made to sketch some developments
in experimental and clinical psychology that provide the essential
theoretical and empirical background for the study reported here.
Of central importance is the relatively recent approach in the
field of perception which lays stress on the "inner" determinants
of perceptual processes, and which insists that in perceptual
research personality factors must be treated as bonafide
independent variables and studied accordingly. Equally important
is the concept in personality theory of the ideal-self, especially
as it relates to self evaluation and thus contributes to the
condition of self-ideal discrepancy. The present study, in
investigating the effects of different levels of self-ideal
discrepancy on the visual perception of human images, is thus
essentially related to both the "new look" in perception, which
stresses inner determinants, and to personality theory insofar as
it is concerned with the problem of the ideal self.
Present Study—In this experiment the measure of self-ideal
discrepancy was taken with respect to three value areas that are
considered to be important in middle-class American culture.
These areas were labeled intellectual, physical and social. The
experimental stimuli were three life-sired photographs of the
faces of college-age males. Each of these was depicted as a
superior achiever in one of the above value areas.
The first independent variable studied was magnitude of
self-ideal discrepancy. On the basis of Ittelson and Slack's
(1958) transactional interpretation of person perception, it was
expected that in some relation to the magnitude of the subject's
8®lf~ideal discrepancy the size-distance characteristics of the
images of other people conceptually relevant to the discrepancy
would be distorted in the Thereness-Thatness apparatus. Specific-
ally, Hypothesis 1 was that high self-ideal discrepant subjects
would perceive the stimuli as larger and closer than would low
self-ideal discrepant subjects. The direction of the hypo-
thesized size-distance distortions was based on two sources of
information. One is the group of studies cited earlier which
demonstrate the relationship between differential object value
and differential size perception. In reference to this phenomenon
Allport states, "The perceived dimensional properties of an object
are altered (accentuated) by the relevance of the object to some
need of the individual" (1955, p. 312). Since the term self-ideal
discrepancy implies the notion of self-dissatisfaction or self-
devaluation, it follows that people high on this variable should
have stronger needs for culturally valued talents and character-
istics than would people who are low on the variable. Accordingly,
would be expected
u
then, the high self-ideal discrepant subjects
to show greater relative size estimation of the experimental
stimuli (faces depicted as outstanding achievers) than would the
low self
-ideal discrepant subjects. The other source of infor-
mation is the first study by Smith (1953). Smith's subjects
dependably set the unpleasant (threatening) faces smaller (farther
away) than the pleasant faces. Taking into consideration that
the subjects were attempting to spatially align the faces with a
fixed marker, and that perceptual distortions of the size-distance
characteristics of the stimuli would contribute to compensations
in the opposite direction, it follows that the unpleasant faces
were set smaller (further away) because they were initially per-
ceived as larger (closer) than the unpleasant faces. If one can
generalize that when the subject is threatened or made uncomfort-
able in this apparatus he tends to perceive the stimuli as larger
and closer than when he is unthreatsned
,
then it seems logical
from this line of reasoning also that the high self- ideal
discrepant subjects, with their greater sense of self-dissatisfaction
and thus greater threat-proness, would be more apt to be threatened
in confronting the images of high achievers and thus more apt to
overestimate the size characteristics of the images.
A second independent variable studied was that of defensive
orientation. Since the concept of self-ideal discrepancy can be
seen as a source of secondary or learned drives (needs) within the
personality, the subjects were also screened for defensive orienta-
tion in order to study analogues of the important clinical
variables of drive and defence in their individual and combined
effects on the perceptual behavior in question. The defensive
tendencies observed were those toward "sensitization" and
"repression" which have been investigated in a number of other
researches (Altrocchi et. al., 1960; Bymne, 1961; Gordon, 1957).
With respect to the relation between this variable and self-ideal
discrepancy, Altrocchi et. al. (1960) have demonstrated that
repressors and sensitizers, as measured by a constellation of
MMPI scales, tend to report different self-ideal discrepancies
because of basically different tendencies in their principal ego-
defensive modes. According to these authors, repressors tend to
report lower self-ideal discrepancies because they tend to deny
their negative characteristics to themselves. Conversely,
sensitizers tend to report higher self-ideal discrepancies
mainly because of their tendencies to emphasize their negative
self characteristics. The former defensive mode is principally
oriented toward threat avoidance; the latter toward threat
confrontation, apparently for purposes of ultimate defence through
intellectual mastery. In line with these findings it was expected
that the sensitizers would tend to reflect the high self-ideal
discrepant trend and that repressors would reflect the low.
Hypothesis 2, then, was that the sensitizers would see the stimuli
as larger and closer than would the repressors. As a corollary
of Hypothesis 1 and 2, it was expected that in the combined effects
of the drive (self-ideal discrepancy) and defence (sensitization vs.
repression) variables the stimuli would be seen as largest and
re-
ciosest by the high self-ideal discrepant sensitizers and
smallest and farthest away by the low self-ideal discrepant
pressors. These hypotheses were based on the assumption that
by emphasizing their negative characteristics to themselves the
sensitizers magnify the self
-devaluation implied in the concept
of self-ideal discrepancy; and conversely, the repressors, by
denying their negative characteristics to themselves, minimize
this self-devaluation.
A third independent variable studied along with magnitude
of self-ideal discrepancy and defensive mode was that of the
position of the various value areas within the subject's value
hierarchy. As mentioned above, three value areas labeled
intellectual, social and physical were represented in this
hierarchy. It seems logical that the relative importance of
a value area to an individual should affect the emotional
loading attached to a stimulus associated with the area, and
hence the individual's perception of that stimulus. Hypothesis
3, then, was that for both magnitudes of self-ideal discrepancy
there would be a tendency for stimuli representing highly valued
areas to be seen as larger and closer than stimuli representing
less highly valued areas. Again the rationale for this
hypothesis is provided by the established relationship between
differential object value and differential size perception. In
addition to this general tendency, it was expected that the high
self-ideal discrepant group relative to the low self-ideal dis-
crepant groups would show a more pronounced differential response
to high-valued stimuli than to low-valued stimuli. Thus
Hypothesis 4 was that In the Interaction between self-ideal dis-
crepancy and position In value hierarchy, the gradient for the
high self-ideal discrepant group across the three value stimuli
would be steeper than the gradient for the low self-ideal dls-
crepant groups.
$}&***? Hypotheses—Following i8 a summary of the hypo-
theses and related expectations pertinent to the three independent
variables of this study.
Hypothesis 1 Self-Ideal Discrepancy
The high self-ideal discrepant Ss were expected
to perceive the stimuli as larger and closer
than were the low self-ideal discrepant Ss.
Hypothesis 2 Defensive Mode
The sensitizers were expected to perceive the
stimuli as larger and closer than were the re-
pressors.
As a corollary to Hypotheses 1 and 2, and with respect to the
combined effects of these two variables
,
there was the additional
expectation that the high self-ideal discrepant sensitizers
would perceive the stimuli as largest and closest, while the low
self-ideal discrepant repressors would perceive them as smallest
and furthest away. No particular expectations were attached to
the other groups (high self-ideal discrepant repressors and low
self-ideal discrepant sensitizers).
1U
Hypothesis 3 Position in Value Hierarchy
For all Ss, stimuli representing highly valued
areas were expected to be perceived as larger
and closer than stimuli representing less highly
valued areas.
Hypothesis 4 Self-Ideal Discrepancy - Position in
Value Hierarchy Interaction
The gradient for the high self-ideal discrepant
group across the three value stimuli was expected
to be steeper than the gradient for the low self-
ideal discrepant groups
METHOD
ExPerlmetltal Design--Table 1 summarizes the design of the
experiment. Subjects were screened for magnitude of self
-ideal
discrepancy by means of a questionnaire constructed by the experi-
menter which was put into a format similar to that of the Bills,
Vance and McClean Index of Adjustment and Values (1951). In the
same sitting the Ss were also screened for defensive mode by use
of an MMPI scale developed by Byrnne (1961). The screening was
done with groups of about 25 Ss, and a total of 194 were given
the two tests. The Ss were undergraduate males enrolled in the
introductory psychology courses at the University of Massachusetts.
In the second phase of the experiment the 72 Ss selected for
the various experimental groups were run individually through the
perceptual task on the Thereness-Thatness apparatus. In this
task each subject made three distance judgments on each of three
stimuli at two positions in the apparatus, giving a total of 18
experimental judgments for each S,. The experimental stimuli
consisted of full-faced, life-sized, black-and-white, semi-matte
photographs of the faces of three college aged males each of
which was depicted as a superior achiever in either the intellectual,
social or physical value area.
The self-ideal discrepancy groups as they were selected
(low self-low ideal, high self-high ideal, and low self-high ideal)
r6prs86Qted all three meaningful dochotomous combinations of three
variables: a self variable, an ideal variable, and an ideal minus
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self (or self-ideal discrepancy) variable. The combination high
self-low ideal is rare and illogical, and thus was not included.
These groupings were done purposely in order to control for con-
founding in the interpretation of the final results. Since self-
ideel discrepancy is a dyadic variable involving two distinct
parts and their interrelationship, and as such offers difficulties
in interpretation (Altrocchi, 1961; Cronbach, 1958), it was
necessary to arrange the self-ideal discrepancy groups in such
a way that relatively independent assessments could be made of
the self and ideal variables. As the groups were arranged: low
self could be compared to high self with ideal held constant by
a comparison of the high self-high ideal and low self-high ideal
groups using only two thirds of the data; and the low ideal could
be compared to high ideal with self held constant by comparing the
low self-low ideal and the low self-high ideal groups using only
two thirds of the data. In addition, the three groups considered
as qualitatively different categories could also be compared just
as they stood. If only two groups had been selected--a low and
a high self-ideal discrepancy group—it would not have been
possible to parcel out separate tests of the self and ideal
variables and thus throw more light on the interpretation of the
self-ideal discrepancy variable by virtue of these.
Self-Ideal Discrepancy Questionnaire—The questionnaire con-
sisted of 60 short, self-descriptive statements of the form
generally employed by Rogers in his self-ideal Q-sorts (Rogers
and Dymond, 1954) — see Appendix A. Forty two of the items were
relevant to the three value areas in question, with 18 buffer items
from one of Roger’s lists randomly Interspersed among them.
The 42 value-relevant Items were divided Into three groups of
14, each group being applicable to one of the value areas under
investigation, and each subdivided into 9 value
-positive and
5 value-negative items. The value-relevant items in each group
were randomly distributed so that no value area was particularly
connected with any portion of the questionnaire.
The intellectual value area was conceptually similar to the
theoretical value of the Allport-Vernon Scale (Allport, Vernon
and Lindzey
,
1951). "I am especially interested in improving
my mind", and ”1 don’t care much for reading", are examples of
intellectual value-positive and value-negative items, respectively.
The physical area concerned itself mainly with direct bodily
attributes and the physical-athletic skills deriving from them.
Reference is made to a similar concept by Kluckhohn and Murray
in an allusion to the Spranger values in Kluckhohn, Murray and
Schneider (1954, p. 23). "I am a good athlete", and "I have an
unattractive physique", are examples of physical value-positive
and value-negative items, respectively. The social value area,
as defined in this study, referred primarily to interpersonal
skills that make for popularity and influence among one's acquaint-
ances. "I conduct myself smoothly at social functions such as
dinner parties, dances and dates, etc.", and "1 am shy", are
examples of social value-positive and value-negative items, re-
spectively.
As mentioned previously, the format of the self-ideal
discrepancy questionnaire was similar to that of the Index of
Adjustment and Values (Bills, Vance and McClean, 1951). Ss
first rated each item in terms of its degree of applicability to
their "actual self". They then went over the items again and
rated each one in terms of its degree of applicability to their
"ideal self-concept". The rating of each item was done by
assigning a number for 1 to 5 which best determined the
a tern's applicability to the aspect of self under scrutiny. One
represented minimal and 5 maximal applicability; the qualitative
designations being: 1—applies hardly at all, 2—applies a little,
3—applies moderately, 4—applies a good deal, and 5—applies very
much. In determining the measure of self-ideal discrepancy, the
numerical differences of the two ratings without regard for sign
was gotten for each item and then the sum of the differences
over all value-relevant items was taken. Consequently, high
agreement between the ratings for self and ideal would produce
a small stmt of differences and thus a low index of self-ideal
discrepancy. Low agreement between the two would in converse
manner produce a high index of discrepancy.
The individual's value hierarchy was aslo assessed in the
questionnaire. That is, a rank-ordering of the intellectual,
social and physical value areas in terms of the Ss' preferences
was obtained.. In the assessment of the value hierarchy only the
27 value-positive items were used. They were arranged in nine
"trios", each "trio" having one item per value area in it. The
S, while bearing his ideal self-concept in mind, established his
preference for the items in a "trio" by assigning to each a
number between 1 and 3. One denoted maximum preference, or
first choice, and 3 minimum preference, or third choice. The
sum of the choices for the items pertinent to each value area
could then be taken over the nine "trios" and the rank order of
the value areas established. In this arrangement the lowest
total would indicate the most preferred area and the highest
total the least. The assessment of the value hierarchy was
obtained in order to study in the perceptual task the third in-
dependent variable—position in the value hierarchy.
In constructing the questionnaire a pool of items was
written under each value area. These were then distributed to
three psychology professors and a professor of education for
suggestions. The items with the best face validity were then
put into a questionnaire and given to 17 undergraduate males
enrolled in the summer session at the University of Massachusetts.
Suggestions were also solicited from each of these students in
the interest of discarding items that were ambiguous, in-
appropriate, etc. In order to further check the validity of
the items, a revised questionnaire was then given to three
groups of students on the campus who by their commitment to
certain activities could be inferred as having strong interests
in one of the value areas in the questionnaire. The groups were,
respectively: 14 senior physical education majors, representing
high physical interests; 12 fraternity social chairmen, repre-
senting high social interests; and a group of 11 students of
junior-senior or graduate status whose majors were either
0**1
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psychology, mathematics or philosophy, these latter representing
high intellectual interests.
The rationale behind this procedure was that if the items
were sufficiently valid the committed groups would show this by
giving first choice in their value hierarchy to the items re-
flecting their chosen activity. The questionnaire was given to
the students in the designated groups
,
and each student's
preference order calculated. The different areas were then
given a rank of 1, 2 or 3 according to the students' preferences,
and these ranks were summed over the students in a group. The
results, expressed in Table 2, represent a total of the ranks
for each value area for the students in each group. They show
that both the social chairmen and the "intellectual" majors had
the lowest scores in the areas reflecting their chosen activity
(lowest scores meaning highest preference)
,
while the physical
education majors produced a first preference tie between social
and physical with intellectual least preferred.
Test for Defensive Mode—A modification of the R-S scale
developed by Bymne (1961) was used to screen the Sa for defensive
mode--see Appendix B. Byrnne's scale is essentially equivalent
to the test used by Altrocchi et. al. (1960) for screening re-
pressors and sensitizers, although Byrnne has introduced structural
changes that make his scale easier to score. It consists of 182
MMPI items, 156 of which are relevant to the sensitizer-repressor
dimension, with 26 buffer items randomly interspersed. In the
modification used in this study only the 156 defense-relevant items
Table 2
Ranks for Value Areas by "Committed" Groups
Value Area
Intellectual Social Physical
Intellectual Majors 12* 22.5 31.5 n=ll
Social Chairmen 26 15* 31 n=12
Physical Education Majors 34 25 25* n=l4
* Score reflecting chosen activity
were used, there being no apparent reason for including the
buffer items.
In taking this test the subject merely decides whether each
item is essentially true or false with respect to himself and
then marks an IBM answer sheet accordingly. The test is designed
in such a way that, as the number of responses in agreement with
the scoring key increases, the inferred tendency toward sensiti-
zation also increases. Thus, high scores suggest sensitizing
tendencies and low scores repressing tendencies, with the
inferred tendencies increasing as the scores approach their
extremes of 156 and 0, respectively.
Th® Altrocchi test, from which Byrnne*s scale derives, con-
sists of a combination of six MMPI scales which are designed to
tap the tendencies toward sensitization and repression, and which
draw heavily on the original psychasthenia and hysteria scales
—
the tendency toward sensitizing defences being conceptually
related to psychasthenia, and the tendency toward repressive
defences to hysteria. The design of the test, in contrast to
that of Byrnne's scale, is such that high positive scores reflect
repressing tendencies and high negative scores sensitizing
tendencies. That is, the T scores for D (depression), Pt
(psychasthenia) without K,aid A (anxiety), which reflect the
sensitizing tendency, are subtracted from the T scores for L
(lie)
,
K (defensiveness--in the sense of an unwillingness to
concentrate on and divulge negative self characteristics) , and Dn
(denial), which reflect the repressing tendency (Altrocchi et. al.
1960)
r>.o
Selection of the Subjects for the Experimental Groups~
Twenty five of the 194 students given the self-ideal discrepancy
questionnaire and R-S scale were discarded either because they
rated their self higher than their ideal or because they produced
a tie between two or three of the areas in their value hierarchy.
The remaining 169 were plotted on a large graph with respect to
their self and ideal scores. The self scores, which covered a
range from -9 to 95 (with a possible range from -48 to 120), was
plotted along the abscissa, and the ideal score, with a range
from 60 to 120 (same possible range)
,
was plotted along the
ordinate. Each plotted point had three additional bits of infor-
mation: the S*
a
number, a coded number from 1 to 6 giving the
sequence in his value hierarchy, and his score on the R-S scale.
By means of this device Ss could be put into one of the three
meaningful combinations of the self and ideal variables: low
self-low ideal, high self-high ideal, and low self-high ideal,
with each combination having a higher ideal than self score. In
actually selecting the Ss the E worked in from the extreme corner
of each quadrant of the graph in order to keep the groups as
divergent as possible. Figure 1 shows the 24 plots in each
quadrant that were picked for the different levels of the self-
ideal discrepancy groups.
The Ss were simultaneously selected for their tendencies
toward sensitization or repression with this device. According
to Byrnne (personal communication) , arbitrary cutting points for
the two tendencies are commonly selected at the extremes of the
• * 9J00S-JI9S IB0PX
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R-S distribution. For example, Byrnne (1961), in a study
correlating R-S scores with the expression of aggressive and
sexual themes on the TAT, defined sensitizers as those scoring
above 78 and repressors as those scoring below 47 on the R-S
scale. In the present study, however, it was not possible to
get this magnitude of difference between the two cutting points,
and a single cutting point of 70 was used to differentiate the
two tendencies. That is, Ss scoring below 70 were defined as
repressors and Ss scoring above 70 as sensitizers. Table 3
gives the scores for self, ideal, ideal minus self (self-ideal
discrepancy)
,
and defensive tendency (R-S) for all the Ss in all
combinations of the self-ideal discrepancy-defensive mode vari-
ables. Mean scores are also given for high and low self, high
and low ideal, high and low ideal minus self, and repression vs.
sensitization.
Thereness-Thatness Apparatus--A diagram of the apparatus is
shown in Figure 2. It represents a modification of the standard
Thereness-Thatness apparatus as described by Hastorf (1950) and
Smith (1953) • It consists of two parallel visual fields separated
by a partition, with the dimensions of each field being 10*6" in
depth, 2' high, and 15" wide. The near end of the right field
is covered by a section of plywood running from the partition to
the right edge of the field. There is an aperture cut in this
section which enables the subject, when he is properly positioned
in the apparatus, to see into the right visual field. This
aperture can be made smaller by lowering a plate hinged to the
Table 3
Self, Ideal, Ideal Minus Self and RJ5 Scores for
All Combinations of Self-Ideal Discrepancy and Defensive Mode
Self -Ideal Ideal-Self * R-S
R 76 H0.9 34.9 57.5
HSHI
113.4 43.1S 70.3 79.0
R 46.3 75.2 28.9 63.2
ball
2 30.2 77.8 47.6 81.3
LSHI
R 38.7 109.8 71.1 58.1
S 26.3 112.3 86.9 85.8
X ^7.9 99.9 51.9 70.8
High Self Mean 73.2
Low Self Mean 35.^
High Ideal Mean 111.7
Low Ideal Mean 76.1
High Ideal-Self Mean 78.6
Low Ideal-Self Mean 40.2
Sensitizer Mean b2.2
Repressor Mean 59*6
* Ideal minus Self score (Self-Ideal discrepancy score)
Figure 2
Thereness-Thatness Apparatus
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head rest
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plywood section. The near end of the left field is completely
open.
There is a head rest 1* in front of the two visual fields
with a small metal shield attached to it in such a way that it
blocks the J3's left eye view of the aperture leading into the
right field. Thus, the right field is seen monocularly with only
the right eye, while the left field is seen with both eyes.
In each of the visual fields there is a movable cart running
on a track down the center of the field. The cart in the left
field, which is connected to a crank near the IS* s left hand,
carries a white vertical rod as a marker which is clearly visible
to the !S at all times. By manipulating the crank the S is able
to position the marker at any point in the depth of the left
visual field. The cart in the right field, which carries the
stimulus, is moved by the E. It is equipped with a small light
which directs a beam of constant illumination onto the stimulus,
and which is powered by electrical contacts set in the track. In
this experiment the stimulus could be set at two positions in the
right visual field: a near position 92 cm. from the near end of
both fields, and a far position 214 cm. from the near end of both
fields. There is also a microswitch on the right side of the
apparatus which is activated by an electrically driven cam. This
switch, which is connected to the electrical contacts powering the
stimulus light, enables the E to illuminate the stimulus for a
constant amount of time in either of the two positions.
Set above the partition and running along the entire depth
of the two visual fields is a metric scale calibrated in fifths
of centimeters. A pointer attached to the white marker on the
left cart is arranged in such a way that the E, standing on the
right side of the apparatus, can accurately read the distance of
the white marker from the near end of the two fields.
left field is lighted by a series of seven low-wattage
bulbs which illuminate it unformly along its entire length. It
is also supplied with a normal allotment of distance cues (grain
of wood, linear perspective of floor and left sidewall, and all
binocular cues). The right field is painted flat black and
covered by a heavy black cloth so that when the stimulus light
is off nothing can be distinguished in it at all, and, when the
stimulus light is on, the stimulus appears to hover in a field
of pitch-blackness. The establishment of pitch-blackness is
done for the purpose of obliterating all such external monocular
distance cues as relative size, linear perspective, interposition,
elevation above artificial horizon, and shadows in the stimulus
field. The metal shield on the headrest, which obstructs the
S*s left eye view of the aperture, eliminates the important
binocular distance cue of retinal disparity. Also, when both
eyes are in the proper position, the partition between the left
and right fields is obscured from view and the two fields appear
to merge.
As mentioned in the introduction, the reduced-cue situation
is employed in order to minimize as much as possible the S/s
ability to accurately localize the distance of the stimulus in
the right visual field. This is done for the ultimate purpose
of making inferences about the S»s perception of the stimulus
on the basis of his distance estimates of it, these being the
dependent variable responses on this modification of the Thereness-
Thatness apparatus. It is hypothesized that the S/s projected size
estimate of the stimulus, which is contingent upon his emotional
cathexis of it (Ittelson and Slack, 1958), may cause the stimulus
to appear displaced from its actual position in the right field,
and that the amount of apparent displacement will be reflected in
the S/ s distance estimate. A final supposition is that in this
apparatus a stimulus whose size is over-estimated will appear
closer than it actually is, and one whose size is under-estimated
will appear farther away than it actually is.
Experimental Stimuli--The stimuli used were photographs of
three graduate students at the University of Massachusetts. In
preparing the stimuli, photographs were taken of five psychology
graduate students and a graduate student in the department of
zoology. The five psychology students were all finishing their
work at the University, and at the time that the data was to be
collected could be depended upon to be away at some other place.
The zoology student, who was expected to still be working at the
University, was selected because of the regularity of his features.
All six models were selected because they had relatively average
faces—faces that were neither exceptionally good or bad looking.
Average faces were selected in order to minimize the possibility
that the stimuli would elicit strong emotional reactions apart
from the social, intellectual and physical meanings attributed
to them by the experimenter. In the final selection of the faces
the zoology student and two psychology students were chosen mainly
because they had the best facial expressions and were the most
equivalent with respect to clarity of detail.
In posing for the photographer the models were instructed
to effect a neutral but pleasant expression. The photographs
were taken in full front view, and later enlarged to life-size
proportions and cut out of their backgrounds. The final stimulus,
then, resembled a real head looking right at the S with an expression
of pleasant attention. These photographs were mounted on heavy
cardboard and fitted with attachments for easily putting them on
and taking them off the stimulus cart.
In collecting the experimental data, although a particular
stimulus represented one value area throughout a particular IS' s
trials, the three stimuli were randomly changed from one value
area to another over different Ss with all permutations equally
represented in all experimental conditions. This was done to
avoid the possibility that any one face, having a particularly
compelling connection to one of the value areas, would represent
this value area throughout the experiment and thus create a
permanent artifact in the stimulus conditions (faces plus verbal
depictions)
.
Prel-tnH nary Data on the Descriptions of the Test Stimuli--A
short pilot study preceded the actual experiment. This was done
both for the purposes of smoothing out the E's operation of the
apparatus, and also to obtain some information on the validity of
the verbal descriptions that were to accompany the experimental
stimuli. After making a number of size-distance judgments of
the stimuli accompanied by the verbal descriptions, the pilot Ss
(undergraduate males at the University of Massachusetts) were
asked for some information about their personal reactions to the
descriptions. They were first asked to read the descriptions,
which were unlabeled, and then place each one in either an
intellectual, social or physical category. At the same time,
they were asked to rate each description in terms of the degree
of excellence of achievement it represented. In making their
ratings they were instructed to assign one of four numbers to
each description, the designations for each number being: 1 -
average achievement, 2 - superior achievement, 3 - very superior
achievement, and 4 - unrealistically superior achievement. In
addition, they were asked two questions about the descriptions;
namely, if they knew or had ever known anyone like the people
depicted, and also, how they felt they themselves compared to the
people described.
All nine pilot Ss placed the unlabeled descriptions in their
appropriate categories. Thus, the possibility that the descrip-
tions were unclear or ambiguous with respect to their proscribed
value areas was ruled out. The averaged achievement ratings for
the three areas were as follows: intellectual 2.88, social 2.44
and physical 2.55. These ratings suggest that the
descriptions
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pointed to levels of achievement between the "superior" and
'•very superior" levels in all cases. Such levels were considered
optimal—that is, high, but not so high as to be unrealistic and
thus difficult or impossible for the Ss to regard seriously. The
general reaction to the two questions also reflected the "out-
standing" but "believable" qualities of the descriptions. Seven
of the nine pilot subjects knew or had known someone who resembled
at least one of the descriptions. In comparing themselves, their
reaction was invariably that of "dubious possibility" that they
could achieve commensurately.
Procedure on the Thereness-Thatness Apparatus—The Ss were
run individually in the perceptual task. After entering the room,
they were seated in front of the apparatus and given general
instructions—see Appendix C. They were told that the experiment
involved the visual perception of different types of people, and
that in the experiment they would see the faces of three seniors
from a neighboring college who had appeared in their college news-
paper during the Fall of 1962. The introduction emphasized that
the seniors had appeared in the newspaper because they were out-
standing individuals.
Before beginning the experimental trials with the faces, each
S was given six warm-up trials—three at each stimulus distance—
with the joker from a deck of playing cards as the warm-up stimulus.
Specifically, the S was instructed to place his head in the head-
rest and raise a hinged shield up in front of his eyes. This
shield, which was attached to the headrest, blocked the right eye
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view into the right field, and also helped to obscure the
between-trial movements of the E. (Besides changing stimuli,
E had to lower the plate making the aperture smaller when the
stimulus was in the far position, and raise the plate making the
aperture larger when the stimulus was in the near position.) At
the occurrence of a verbal "ready" signal from the E, the S_ was
instructed to lower the shield and wait for the stimulus presenta-
tion. Approximately two seconds after the "ready" signal was
given, the stimulus was illuminated for a period of four seconds.
The S, was instructed to wait until the stimulus light went off
before he made his distance estimate by cranking the white
marker to a position opposite that at which the stimulus had
appeared. That is, S made his settings from memory, this condi-
tion being introduced in order to simulate the "passing" or
transitory kind of perceptual situation in which the hypothesized
distortion of size characteristics could be expected to occur.
S was told to say "Okay" after he had completed his setting in
order to signal to E that he could go ahead and record the
distance on the metric scale. After securing his reading, E
said "move"
,
which was the signal for S to move the marker back
to a common position in the center of the left field. Following
this, S raised the shield and waited for the next "ready" signal
which in turn introduced the next trial
.
Immediately after the sixth warm-up trial, S was told that
the experimental faces would follow and that each would be pre-
ceded by a resume of the appropriate newspaper article.
The first
time that a face was shown it was preceded by its entire descriptive
paragraph—see Appendix D. On the five successive
occasions
(each face appearing six times) it was accompanied by a fragment
from the paragraph. This was done in such a way that the main
points of the appropriate paragraph were chronologically re-stated
in the succeeding presentations of each face. Thus, on each
experimental trial, and immediately preceding the "ready” signal,
a certain amount of information was given which was designed to
give the visual stimulus (face) meaning with respect to one of
the value areas.
On each trial the particular stimulus and the stimulus
distance were varied. The variation was not random, however,
the stimulus being consistently varied in the order value rank
#1 - value rank #2 - value rank #3, while the position variable
was consistently varied in the order near - far. That is, the
first six stimulus presentations (representing trial one) were
in the following order: value rank #1, near position; value
rank #2, far position; value rank #3, near position; value rank
#1, far position; value rank #2, near position; value rank #3,
far position. This same sequence was repeated for trials two and
three. There seemed to be no reason to completely randomize the
stimulus-position sequence, and the above sequence seemed optimal
for maintaining the £>'s interest.
The near - far distance variation was introduced for a
methodological reason, namely, to guard against assumptions by
the Ss that the stimuli were always in the same place. In this
sense it had no interpretive significance in its main effect on
the Ss* size-distance settings. However, it offered the possibility
of information arising from interactions between itself and the
drive, defense and value hierarchy variables.
All Ss were run in a darkened room, this being done to enhance
the reduced-cue situation in the right field of the apparatus.
Also, a tape recorder producing a rather loud "white noise" was
turned on between trials in order to mask any auditory cues that
the Ss might get from the wheels of the stimulus cart as to the
stimulus position on the ensuing trial.
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RESULTS
In the perceptual task, all 72 Ss had three trials on each of
three stimuli at each of two distances for a grand total of 1296
scores. For purposes of analysis the experimental data were broken
into four separate distributions of 432 scores each, three of them
representing the scores for all Ss on each trial, and the fourth
representing the mean of the three trials for all jSs. Before
analysing any of the data a square root transformation was applied
in order to make the variances of the distributions at the near and
far stimulus positions approximately homogeneous.
Of principal interest were the scores for trial one and the
scores for the mean of the trials. Trial one was important because
it could be considered to be relatively free of any adaptation or
habituation effects that might have set in over the latter two trials.
The mean of the trials was important as an indication of the trends
over all trials. Tables 4 and 5 show the means and variances for
all cells in the experimental design for both trial one and the
mean of the trials. Table 6 shows the means for the different levels
of the experimental variables for both trial one and the mean of the
trials.
Table 7 presents the analysis of variance for trial one with
the three sampled self-ideal discrepancy groups treated as qualita-
tively different categories. None of the main effects for self-
ideal discrepancy, defensive mode, or position in value hierarchy
attained statistical significance. The main effect for stimulus
Table 4
Means and Variances of Square Root Scores in
All Cells of the Total Design for Trial One
Di D2
Mean
c
i C2 C3 C
C
1 C2 °3
B, 10.490 10.112 10.249 14.868 14.575 14.851
*1
1
Var. 1.313 2.643 1.649 3.109 3.680 3.379
% Mean 10.055 10.910 IO.509 14.448 14.150 14.6672
Var. 2.629 1.564 2.446 2.423 3.288 2.450
B,
Mean 9.883 9.877 9.953 14.286 14.329 14.932
1
Var. 2.665 3.655 4.958 2.000 2.519 1.628
A
2
10.965B
o
Mean 11.109 10.893 15.418 15.184 15.400
2
Var. 1.195 1.780 1.451 1.009 1.317 1.311
h Mean 10.266 10.110 9.930 14.700 14.226 14.595
*3
Var. 1.319 .701 1.411 1.524 2.307 2.328
Bo
Mean 10.450 10.621 10.388 14.884 14.494 14.845
2
Var. 1.429 1.3W 2.537 1.811 3.011 2.585
A. LSLI
A
2
hshi
a
3
lshi
Repressors
B
2
Sensitizers
Value rank 1
C
2
Value rank 2
Cj Value rank 3
D, Near position
D_ Far position
12 scores in each ABCD cell; total = 432 scores
Table 5
Means and Variances of Square Root Scores in
All Cells of the Total Design for the Mean of Trials
h Mean
Var.
10.292
1.379
10.235
2.362
B Mean 10.468 10.732
2
Var. 1.926 1.113
B
Mean 9.659 9.685
A
2
1
Var. 2.505 3.040
B Mean 11.091 10.800
2
Var. 1.055 1.763
B Mean 10.303 10.196
"3
*1
Var. 1.236 1.093
B Mean 10.709 10.514
*2
Var. I.696 1.780
C
3
ci C2 °3
10.273 14.964 14.933 14.974
1.431 3.328 4.079 3.075
10.610 14.530 14.512 14,712
1.916 1.902 2.142 2.093
9.785 14.328 14.467 14.850
2.769 2.039 1.775 1.256
10.875 15.439 15.363 15.498
1.286 1.103 1.136 .933
10.090 14.806 14.502 14.528
.883 1.974 2.378 2.438
10.485 14.890 14.785 14.840
2.413 1.761 2.240 2.136
A^ ISLI B^ Repressors
A^ HSHI Sensitizers
LSHI
Value rank 1 Near position
C
2
Value rank 2 Far position
Value rank 3
4 >**
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Table 6
Summary of the Means for the Different Levels of the
Experimental Variables for Trial One and Mean of Trials
(Entries = square roots of Distance scores)
Self-Ideal Discrepancy Trial One Mean of Trials
(LSLI) 12.W ( 2 )* 12.603 ( 2 )
a
2
(HSHE) 12.685 (3) 12.651 ( 3 )
(LSHI) 12.459 (1) 12.554 (1)
Defensive Mode
B^ (Repressors) 12.346 (1 ) 12.382 ( 1 )
(Sensitizers) 12.690 ( 2 ) 12.825 (2)
Combined Effects of Self-Ideal
Discrepancy and Defensive Mode
A^ (LSLI-R) 12.524 (4) 12.612 (4)
a
1
b
2
(LSLI-S) 12.462 (3) 12.594 ( 3 )
a
2
b
1
(HSHI-R) 12.210 (1) 12.129 (1)
a
2
b
2
(hshi-s) 13.161 (6) 13.178 (6)
a
3
b
1
(LSHI-R) 12.304 (2) 12.404 (2)
A
3
B
£
(LSHI-S
)
12.614 (5) 12.704 ( 5 )
Position in Value Hierarchy
(rank l) 12.571 ( 2 ) 12.623 (2)
C
2
(rank 2) 12.459 (1 ) 12.560 (1)
C
3
( rank 3
)
12.607 ( 3 ) 12.627 ( 3 )
Numbers in parentheses determine the rank order in terms of
apparent closeness to S. Lowest number = closest; highest =
farthest away.
Table 7
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Trial One
Source of Variance df ms F
Total 431
Between Ss 71
A (Self-Ideal Discrepancy) 2 2.157 .207
B (Defensive Mode) 1 17.218 1.652
A X B 2 9.472 .909
Ss/AB (1) 66 10.419
Within Ss 360
C (Position in Hierarchy) 2 .859 2.191
D (Stimulus Distance) 1 2033.765 1976.4W*
CXD 2 2.075 4.964**
A X C 4 .225 .574
B X C 2 CMVO. .923
A X D 2 .646 .628
BXD 1 2.748 2.671
AXCXD 4 .377 .902
B X C X D 2 .622 1.488
AXBXC 4 .906 2.311
AXBXD 2 COcvcv• .328
A X B X C X D 4 .291 .696
Ss X C/AB (2) 132 .392
Ss X D/AB (3) 66 1.029
SsXCX D/AB (4) 132 .418
** p< .01 level of significance
error term for A, B, A X B
error term for C f A X C, B X C, AXBXC
error tern for D, A X D, BXD, AXBXD
error term for CXD, AXCXD, B X C X D, AX3XCXD
distance was highly significant, but as was mentioned previously,
this variable was included for methodological reasons only and had
no interpretive significance in terms of its main effect. The only
other significant effect using trial one data was the first order
interaction between position in value hierarchy and stimulus distance
(CXD) . This interaction was not interpretable in terms of any of
the experimental hypotheses. At the near distance the stimulus
representing the least valued area in the value hierarchy was seen
as largest (closest)
,
the stimulus representing the most valued
area as intermediately sized, and the stimulus representing the
intermediate value area as smallest (farthest away) . At the far
position the most valued stimulus maintained its intermediate posi-
tion, with the relationship between the intermediately and least
valued stimuli being reversed. This interaction was also significant
in a separate analysis of variance in which low ideal versus high
ideal replaced the three sampled self-ideal discrepancy groups as the
different levels of the A variable.. The relationship between the
differently valued stimuli at the two distances was the same as that
described above.
Table 8 presents the analysis of variance for the mean of the
trials with the three sampled self-ideal discrepancy groups treated
as qualitatively different categories. Again none of the main
effects for the experimental variables (self-ideal discrepancy,
defensive mode, and position in value hierarchy) attained statistical
Table 8
Summary of Analysis of Variance for the Mean of Trials
50
Source of Variance df ms F
Total 431
Between Ss 71
A (Self-Ideal Discrepancy) 2
.712 .071
B (Defensive Mode) 1 21.236 2.129
A X B 2 10.789 1.089
Ss/AB (1) 66 9.974
Within Ss 360
C (Position in Hierarchy) 2 .202 1.255
D (Stimulus Distance) 1 2139.575 2035.750**
CXD 2 .251 2.221
A X C 4 .400 2.848*
BXC 2 .016 .099
A X D 2 1.354 1.288
BXD 1 4.191 3.988*
A X C X D 4 .106 .938
BXCXD 2 .006 .053
AXBXC 4 .316 1.953
AXBXD 2 .743 .707
AXBXCXD 4 .101 .894
Ss X C/AB (2) 132 .161
Ss X D/AB (3) 66 1.051
SsXCX D/AB (f
)
132 .113
** p <' .ol level of significance
* p ( .05 level of significance
(1) error term for A, B, A X B
(2) error tern for C, A X C, BXC, AXBXC
( 3 ) error term for D, A X D, BXD, AXBXD
(4) error term for CXD, A X C, BXCXD, AXBXCXD
significance. Two interactions were significant, however. One
was the first order interaction between self-ideal discrepancy and
position in value hierarchy (AXC)
. As shown in figure 3, this inter-
action was caused mainly by the divergence of the trend of the low
self-high ideal group from the trends of the low self-low ideal and
high self-high ideal groups across the three levels of the position
in hierarchy variable. Whereas, in moving from the most highly
valued stimulus to the least valued stimulus the low self-low ideal
and high self-high ideal groups tended to see the stimuli as
generally slightly smaller; the low self-high ideal group moving
in the same direction tended to see the stimuli as progressively
larger. Thus, the two low self-ideal discrepant groups tended to
reflect the hypothesized trend that highly valued stimuli would
be seen as larger and closer than less highly valued stimuli (with
the one exception that in the high self-high ideal group the most
valued stimulus was seen as smaller than the intermediately valued
stimulus)
,
while the high self-ideal discrepant group tended to
reflect the obverse of the hypothesized trend.
The other significant effect, which is expressed in figure 4,
was the first order interaction between defensive mode and stimulus
distance (BXD) . This interaction indicated that although the
stimuli were seen as larger and closer by the repressors at both
distances, the difference between the two groups was larger at the
near distance than at the far. Although the main effect for
defensive mode did not attain statistical significance in any of
the analyses that were run, there was a consistent relationship
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expressed between the two levels of this variable. This was the
tendency, expressed at both stimulus distances in the BXD inter-
action, for the repressors to see the stimuli as larger and closer
than did the sensitizers. For both trial one and the mean of the
trials this relationship was consistently expressed in all cells of
the total design except for the six cells representing the low
self-low ideal repressors and sensitizers at the far stimulus
distance. In this one case the repressors tended to see the stimuli
as smaller and farther away than did the sensitizers.
As mentioned in the method section, the self-ideal discrepancy
groups were selected in such a way that independent analyses of
variance of a 2 X 2 split plot design could be run in which the A
variable would consist of high and low levels of self and ideal.
Two of these analyses were run on the data for trial one . There
were no significant effects in the analysis in which the A variable
consisted of high and low levels of self. In the other involving
high and low levels of ideal, only the previously reported CXD
interaction was significant. Since in the two original analyses
°f trial one and the mean of the trials— in which the A variable
consisted of the three qualitatively different self-ideal groups—
the Fs for the A variable were so small, no further separate
analyses were run (those omitted being comparisons of high and low
levels of self and ideal for the mean of the trials)
.
In analysing the relationships between the means of the
both for main effects and their interactions,various groups
information was obtained about the distances (sizes) at which the
experimental stimuli were perceived. However, it was also
meaningful to obtain information about the variances of the
groups, since this would provide information on the
degree of inconsistency of size-distance perception around a
particular group s central tendency. Consequently variances were
computed on the scores for the Ss in each level of self-ideal
discrepancy (as sampled), defensive mode, and the combined effects
of these variables. These variances were computed separately for
both stimulus positions. Only one F ratio was significant, that
being the ratio between the low self-low ideal repressors and the
high self-high ideal sensitizers at the far position, with the
repressors showing the greater variance. An interesting trend
occurred, however. As presented in table 9, the variances for the
repressors were greater than those for the sensitizers at both
stimulus distances. In addition, this same relationship was
maintained in all but one of the cells in the self-ideal
discrepancy-defensive mode combination at both stimulus distances,
the one exception being that the variance for the low self-high
ideal sensitizers was greater than that for the low self-high ideal
repressors at the near position.
In terms of the analyses of both means and variances, then,
there was a tendency in this experiment for the repressors to
perceive the stimuli as larger and closer than did the sensitizers,
and also to fluctuate more around their own central tendency than
did the sensitizers.
Table 9
Variances for AH Levels of Self—Ideal Discrepancy (A),
Defensive Mode (B), and the Combination of Both (AX B)
For the Near and Far Stimulus Positions
on the Mean of the Trials
Near Far
LSLI 1.52 2.62
(A) hshi 2.22 1.48
LSHI 1.39 F max/min=1.59 2.05 F max/min=1.77
(B)
Repressors I.69 2.31
Sensitizers 1.48 F max/min=l.l4 I.76 F max/min=1.31
LSLI-R 1.63 3.38
LSLI-S 1.50 1.93
(AXB) HSHI-R 2.56 1.63
HSHI-S 1.27 1.04
LSHI-R .98 2.23
LSHI-S 1.86 F max/min=2.6l 2.03 F max/min=3.25*
* Significant at .05 level. Variances for (A) computed on 24
independent scores each; for (B) on 36 independent scores; and
for (AXB) on 12 independent scores. Each independent score
consisted of the mean of 6 scores—the 3 trial scores and the
3 scores for the different stimuli.
DISCUSSION
The first experimental hypothesis—concerning the differential
of low and high levels of self-ideal discrepancy on the
size-distance perception of related human images - -was not borne
out in this study. In none of the analyses were the differences
between the means of the three self-ideal discrepancy groups
statistically significant. However, the relationship among these
means did express the hypothesized trends both for trial one and
the mean of the trials. Aside from the possible invalidity of
the hypothesis, certain methodological conditions may have con-
tributed to the lack of significance in the data. One was the
failure on the part of the E to determine to some degree the
validity of the self-ideal discrepancy scores obtained with the
questionnaire, quite apart from the validation of value hierarchy
scores described previously. Although the self-ideal discrepancy
variable has been used in many other researches (Wiley, 1961), it
is possible that this particular application of it—assessing it
with respect to specific value areas as opposed to general
personality adjustment, as is more commonly done—may be in some
way inherently untenable. Validity checks in the form of
significant correlations with other tests of self-assessment,
and also in the form of personal interviews with the preliminary
testees may well have indicated sources of weakness in the
questionnaire itself.
Another weakness may reside in the manner in which the
questionnaire was administered. As described in the method
section, groups of approximately 25 students were given the
self-ideal discrepancy questionnaire and the R-S scale in a
single sitting. There is the possibility that in the group
administration, with little or no establishment of tester-testee
rapport, the majority of the students responded to the question-
naire in a mechanical, minimally-introspective way in order to
finish and leave the test situation as quickly as possible.
Such a mode of response could have seriously sapped the instru-
ment of its functional validity. Rogers (1954), for one, is
seemingly free of this difficulty in his particular use of the
self-ideal discrepancy variable as an indicator of change in
psycho-therapy. Since his testees are simultaneously patients
in therapy, he would appear to have much greater opportunity for
establishing good rapport with them and thereby enlisting their
sensitive, serious introspection in response to his self-ideal
discrepancy Q sorts.
These two sources of methodological inadequacy should be
borne in mind in any evaluation of this particular manifestation
of self-ideal discrepancy as a determinant of perceptual dis-
tortion. In light of the extensive literature on both the inner
determinants of perception (Allport, 1955) and the self-ideal
discrepancy variable (Wiley, 1961) , rectification of such
methodological weaknesses should be carried out in further studies
before the general hypothesis is considered invalid.
The third experimental hypothesis was also not confirmed in
the study. This hypothesis predicted that for all Ss the stimuli
seen as larger
representing more highly valued areas would be
and closer than the stimuli representing less highly valued areas.
In addition, this tendency was expected to be more extreme in the
high self-ideal discrepancy groups than in the low. As stated
previously, the rationale for this hypothesis comes from the
extensive body of research summarized by Allport (1955) which
points to a relationship between differential object value and
differential size estimation, with more highly valued objects
generally receiving larger size estimates. Although none of the
studies cited used humans (or human images) as stimuli, there
seemed to be no reason why such stimuli, on the basis of different
associated value-meanings, would not be subject to similar per-
ceptual distortions. Again, the lack of confirmatory data may
in part be attributed to conditions of this particular study.
There is the possibility that the three stimuli as presented
were not, in general, valued differently--at least not enough
to mediate measurable perceptual differences. Even though people
may tend to emphasize any one of the intellectual, social or
physical value areas in their daily lives, it is quite likely,
due to the importance of all three value areas in this culture,
that all of the stimuli were rather similarly cathected by the
majority of the Ss. In light of the pervasive cultural press
toward overall self-perfection this becomes even more credible.
Without a sufficient gradient of object value, then, it is not
difficult to understand the lack of a parallel response gradient
in terms of differential size estimates of the stimuli.
GO
In a subsequent study, a steeper and more meaningful
gradient of object value might be obtained by presenting similar
stimuli differentially described as superior, average and inferior
achievers. In such an arrangement, characteristics from each of
the three distinct value areas might be included in each of the
descriptions so that each of the three stimuli would reflect
different levels of a more general achievement. Post-experimental
comments from a number of the Ss suggested that the descriptive
paragraphs reflected achievements that were too specialized, and
that combinations of qualities from the three value areas would
have been more realistic.
At this point in the discussion a suggestion concerning an
improvement of the Thereness-Thatness apparatus, as regards its
use with human images, is appropriate. By the proper use of
mirrors in the stimulus field, it seems possible that actual
human beings, positioned to the right of the stimulus field,
could be presented as experimental stimuli. Real humans talking,
grimacing and interacting with the Ss would seemingly increase
the reality of this kind of study. Perhaps this improvement, along
with those suggested for the self-ideal discrepancy questionnaire
and the experimental stimuli as they stood, might further enhance
the various non-significant trends observed in this study.
The significant interaction between self-ideal discrepancy
and position in value hierarchy (AXC) for the mean of the trials
is difficult to interpret. As mentioned previously, the main
effect for self-ideal discrepancy, though lacking statistical
(A
significance, did express the hypothesized relationship among
the group means. That is, that the high self-ideal discrepant
Ss (low self-high ideal) would see the stimuli as larger and
closer than would the low self-ideal discrepant Ss (low self-
low ideal, high self-high ideal). In the interaction in
question this relationship was switched for the highest valued
stimulus but not for the intermediately and lowest valued
stimuli. This single stimulus was seen as smaller and farther
away by the high self-ideal discrepant Ss than by the other Ss.
Since the main effect for position in value hierarchy was non-
significant, one might dismiss the switch in relationship at
the highest valued stimulus as a chance phenomenon. This
alternative gains strength if one seriously considers the above
discussion concerning the lack of differential value cathexis
of the experimental stimuli.
On the other hand the switch at the most highly valued
stimulus might be interpreted otherwise. It may be that in
facing this stimulus the high self-ideal discrepant Ss
consciously or unconsciously responded with a primitive protec-
tion mechanism; one which served the purpose of putting distance
between themselves and the stimulus. Because of their relatively
low self-esteem, which is implied in the condition of high self-
ideal discrepancy, these Ss may have felt particularly uncomfor-
table in this situation—especially if the most highly valued
area in the value hierarchy is. emphasized in one's daily life.
Analogous tendencies are seen in the behavior of schizophrenics
who are generally considered to be extremely low In self-esteem
(Fromm-Relchmann, 1959; Sullivan, 1961), and who are also co^nonly
characterized by marked social withdrawal. For instance. Sommers
(1959) reported that in a study involving verbal communication
while seated at a table, schizophrenics tended to put greater
distance between one another than did non-schizophrenic patients
and normals. They also demonstrated evasive behaviors such as
looking away from their partner and wandering aimlessly away from
their seats. Although this does not point to any basic connection
between high self-ideal discrepancy and manifest or latent schizo-
phrenia, it does suggest possible parallels between the two, both
in terms of low levels of self-esteem and "distancing" techniques
in interpersonal situations.
Though not statistically significant at .05 level, the re-
sults produced by the defensive mode variable (Hypothesis 2) were
of interest. As summarized in the previous section, the repressors
consistently perceived all stimuli as larger and closer than did
the sensitizers. Also, in the combined effect for self-ideal dis-
crepancy and defensive mode this same general trend prevailed.
That is, the repressing groups tended to perceive the stimuli as
larger and closer than did the sensitizing groups. In addition,
as revealed by inspection of the relationships among the variances,
the repressors tended to fluctuate more about their own central
tendency than did the sensitizers.
With regard to the relationships among the means, these re-
sults ran counter to the hypothesized trands. On the basis of
findings by Altrocchi et. al. (1960), which demonstrate a
correlation between high self-ideal discrepancy and sensitizing
tendencies, the sensitizers were expected to perceive the stimuli
as larger and closer than were the repressors. In the combined
effect for the self-ideal discrepancy and defensive mode variables
the high self-ideal discrepant sensitizers were expected to per-
ceive the stimuli as largest and closest, and the low self -ideal
discrepant repressors as smallest and farthest away--no particular
relationship being hypothesized for the other two groups.
The factor of suggestibility might be used to throw some
light on these results. Since the Ss* responses to the visual
stimuli were purportedly influenced by the verbal descriptions
accompanying them, differential suggestibility, or "influenci-
bility"
,
among the Ss might have served to mediate differential
object cathexes and thus differential size estimates of the
stimuli. The clinical literature has long expressed an intimate
relationship between the syndrome hysteria and the characteristic
of hyper-suggestibility (Stukat, 1958, p. 130). In addition, the
psychoanalytic literature points to an equally intimate relation-
ship between hysteria and repression, repression being the
principal ego-defense mechanism of the hysterical type of per-
sonality (Fenichel, 1945). By continuing this line of reasoning,
it would not be illogical to infer that the repressors in this
study were relatively more "suggestible" than the sensitizers,
and thus predisposed to larger size estimates of the stimuli in
connection with the descriptive paragraphs supplied by E. Reference
to the clinical correlates of sensitizing tendencies would seem
to strengthen this idea. These tendencies supposedly correlate
with the intellective, ruminating, doubting traits of people who
employ obsessive-compulsive defenses (Altrocchi et. al., 1960).
Where one might visualize the repressors responding with un-
reflective compliance to E*s descriptions, the sensitizers might
be imagined to have immediately responded with doubt and restraint,
as if to say, "I'll have to see more of him".
Controlled experiments in this area have produced conflicting
c
results, however. Although Eysenk (1947) found neurotics to be
more suggestible than normals, he did not find a significant
difference in the suggestibility of hysterics as compared to
non-hysterics. In fact, he found the mean suggestibility score
of the dysthymics (correlative to obsessive-compulsive) to be
slightly higher than that for the hysterics. Stukat (1958), in
a most comprehensive study of suggestibility, produced results
that are partly in agreement and partly in conflict with Eysenck's
findings. He, too, found that neurotics show more secondary
(ideational) suggestibility than do normals, and that hysterics
are not more inclined toward secondary suggestibility than non-
hysterics. However, in a further series of studies relating
suggestibility to such factors as need for conformity and
situational expectations, he found that young individuals, women,
neurotics and anxious personalities—those showing greater need
for conformity—showed greater tendencies to secondary suggesti-
bility. At least the young and female characteristics can be
linked conceptually with repression tendencies. According to
Shafer (1954)
,
the type of person who relies heavily on repressive
defenses can be expected to exhibit immaturity, emotional lability,
naivete and general restriction of creative and intellectual
processes. That hysteria (emphasizing repressive defenses) is
more common among women than men is a well known clinical fact.
The results of the study by Kaufer (1961) mentioned in the
introduction might also be linked with the results obtained here.
Using the Thereness-Thatness situation, Kaufer found that the
"moving-towards" subjects tended to perceive representations of
human figures as larger and closer than the "moving-away" subjects.
According to Homey’s trichotomous classification of interpersonal
orientations, the "moving-toward" type of personality is princi-
pally dependent, compliant and excessively needful of the love,
support and affection of others, while the "moving-away" type
tends toward social withdrawal and aloofness. The characteristics
of the "moving-toward" type seem in their dependent aspects to be
similar to those described by Schafer in connection with excessive
use of repressive defenses.
Although these results are equivocal, an explanation can be
offered for the tendency of the repressors to see the stimuli as
larger and closer than did the sensitizers. This is based on the
assumption, admittedly tenuous, that the repressors tended to be
more suggestible than the sensitizers, and thus tended to be more
influenced by the descriptive paragraphs accompanying the stimuli.
Since these paragraphs depicted characteristics that are generally
valued in this culture, it is further assumed that the relatively
greater suggestibility of the repressors tended to mediate, or
contribute to, greater size estimates of the experimental stimuli.
One could just as well emphasize the hypo-suggestibility or
"criticalness" of the sensitizers in this explanation, especially
since the perceptual tendencies of the two groups were evaluated
in relation to one another. (In absolute terms, both groups
perceived the stimuli as being smaller and farther away than they
actually were, this tendency apparently being due to some arti-
fact in the apparatus.) Taking this into consideration, it is
possible to speculate further on the connection between these
perceptual tendencies and the inferred defensive techniques of
the two groups. Perhaps the tendency to perceive relatively
"uncritically" contributes to, or even necessitates, the use of
the cruder avoidant and denial techniques that are basic to the
repressing defense. That is, percepts of a threatening nature
may achieve excessive emotional impact before they are dealt
with by the blanket-like avoidances and denials used by repressing
types (hysterics). On the other hand, the "critical" attitude
of the sensitizing type may help to initially attenuate the
threat-value of the percept and thus allow the ego greater lati-
tude for further intellectual processing of the incoming infor-
mation.
The significant interaction between defensive mode and
stimulus distance (BXD) expressed the same relationship between
and sensitizers at both stimulus distances—thethe repressors
repressors perceiving the stimuli as larger and closer. The
interaction was caused by the decrease in difference between the
two groups at the far position relative to the near. This
decrease may be an artifact of the square root transformation
that was performed on the data in order to approximate homo-
geniety of variance at the two stimulus positions. On the other
hand, we may speculate that the stimuli at the far position were
sufficiently reduced in degree of threat so that the divergent
defensive modes of the two groups were less necessary at this
position. As a result, the perceptual differences due to these
modes was reduced. This interpretation would be consistent with
the "distancing" mechanism mentioned above in connection with the
interpretation of the AXC interaction.
The tendency of the repressors to fluctuate more about their
own mean, as expressed in the variance data, also seems to fit
with the personality characteristics that have been connected
with repressing defenses; i.e., immaturity, naivete, emotional
lability and curtailment of intellectual development.
In summary, then
,
none of the hypotheses for main effects
were statistically confirmed. However, with respect to self-
ideal discrepancy, the means for the different groups were
arranged according to the hypothesized trends on both trial one
and the mean of the trials. Cettain methodological weaknesses
were considered in connection with the failure to obtain statisti -
cal significance with this variable. The main effect for defensive
mode also showed a consistent trend throughout the experiment.
This was the tendency for the repressors to perceive the stimuli
as larger and closer than did the sensitizers. A tentative
explanation for this phenomenon in terms of the greater relative
suggestibility of the repressors was offered. Another consistent,
though statistically non-significant, trend was the tendency for
the repressors to fluctuate more (show greater variance) about
their own central tendency. This was also tentatively explained
in terms of personality factors which correlate with repressive
defenses and hyper-suggestibility.
In addition to these non-significant trends, three first
order interactions did attain significance. The interaction
between position in value hierarchy and stimulus distance (CXD)
,
which was significant on trial one , was not interpretable in
terms of any of the experimental hypotheses. The interaction
between self-ideal discrepancy and position in value hierarchy
(AXC)
,
which was significant on the mean of the trials, and
which was due mainly to the divergence of the low self-high ideal
Ss from the expected trend, was tentatively interpreted in two
ways. On the one hand, it could be regarded as a chance
phenomenon; on the other hand, it might be seen, contrary to
prior expectations, as reflecting the operation in the low self-
high ideal Ss of a schizophrenic-like "distancing” response in
an uncomfortable situation. Finally, the interaction between
defensive mode and stimulus distance (BXD) was significant on
the mean of the trials. This effect, which was caused by the
decrease in difference between the sensitizers and the repressors
at the far position relative to the near, also seemed open to
two interpretations. One alternative was to regard it as an
artifact of the square root transformation which was applied to
the data; the other attributed the decrease in divergent
defensive tendencies of the two groups to the reduced threat
qualities of the stimuli at the far position.
Perspective—This study was undertaken in order to investi-
gate the effects on perceptual behavior of a particular kind of
mental constellation; i.e., degree of self-ideal discrepancy.
Although the results were not statistically significant, they
do suggest some interesting theoretical implications. It is
possible, as suggested by the trend among the means of the self-
ideal discrepancy groups, that increasing degrees of this dis-
crepancy do contribute to overestimations of the size of certain
relevant objects. If this were statistically confirmed in further
methodologically superior experiments, it would be a valuable
contribution to the existing literature on the inner determinants
of perception (Allport, 1955), and also a possible source of in-
sight into the social behaviors of various groups of people who
can be thought of as having this or related conditions. For
instance, the "distancing" techniques of the above mentioned
schizophrenics patients (Sommers, 1959), might be better under-
stood in terms of the tendency of these patients to perceptually
overestimate the sizes of other people in their environments.
Such perceptual distortions might serve to mediate excessive
feelings of fear and inadequacy and thus contribute to the social
withdrawal of these patients. This would be consistent with the
apparent "distancing" behavior of the high self-ideal discrepant
Ss in response to the most highly valued stimulus in the AXC
interaction, the interpretation offered here being that the most
highly valued stimulus may have been initially perceived as
largest and closest by these Ss, but then consciously or un-
consciously "distanced" due to emotional discomfort.
Experimental validation of this hypothesis might also throw
light on the relationship between self-evaluation add levels of
aspiration in less seriously stricken people. For example, Snygg
and Combs (1948) maintain that the goals that people set are
related to the concepts they hold of themselves, and that people
who value themselves highly will strive for high goals, while
people who have low opinions of themselves will be content with
mediocre attainments. It is possible in the latter type--who
seem more similar to high self-ideal discrepant people--that the
leaning toward mediocre goals is in part mediated by the tendency
to overestimate the sizes, and other relevant characteristics,
of the persons and objects with whom they must interact in
pursuit of their goals. These distortions may then predispose
thepersons with low self-evaluations to feeling of weakness and
inadequacy, and thus into acceptance of mediocre attainments. In
one sense this "partial withdrawal" can be seen as a less severe
manifestation of the more total schizophrenic withdrawal. Perhaps
the social withdrawal of schizophrenics, the "partial withdrawals"
from the competitive sphere of persons with low self-regard, and
the apparent ’’distancing" response of the high self-ideal dis-
crepant Ss in the AXC interaction of this study are (were) all
mediated, to some extent, by the same perceptual mechanism.
The trend expressed by the defensive mode variable also
suggests an interesting research problem. In a recent study
using a tachistoscope and threatening (failure related) stimuli,
Tempone (1961) found that repressors exhibited higher recognition
thresholds than did sensitizers. This finding is in accord with
the findings of older studies relating perceptual (recognition)
thresholds for threatening stimuli to differential ego-defensive
modes analogous to the present repression-sensitization dichotomy
(Lazarus, Eriksen and Fonda, 1951; Eriksen, 1952). With the
Thereness-Thatness apparatus it is possible to obtain a different
kind of perceptual data from Ss screened along the repression-
sensitization dimension. Information on the size-distance
perception of expressly threatening stimuli by such Ss would
throw further light on perceptual characteristics of sensitizers
and repressors
,
and might also clarify their tendencies to show
differential recognition thresholds in the tachistoscopic situa-
tion
SUMMARY
The purpose of this study was to explore the effects of
different levels of self-ideal discrepancy on the size-distance
perception of human images relevant to the discrepancy. Two
different ego-defensive modes were also studied for their effects,
both individually and in combination with the different levels
of self-ideal discrepancy, on the perceptual behavior in question.
The Ss were undergraduate males at the University of
Massachusetts. A total of 194 Ss were given a self-ideal dis-
crepancy questionnaire based upon intellectual, social and
physical characteristics, and a scale consisting of 156 MMPI
items which measured their ego-defensive tendencies in terms
of sensitization or repression. Seventy two Ss were selected
for the perceptual task on the Thereness-Thatness apparatus.
These Ss formed six groups (12 per group) which represented all
combinations of the three qualitatively different self-ideal
discrepancy categories (low self-high ideal, high self-ideal
discrepant; low self-low ideal, low self-ideal discrepant; high
self-high ideal, low self-ideal discrepant) and the two ego-
defensive modes (repression vs. sensitization).
In the perceptual task the stimuli were three full face,
life-sized photographs of college aged males. Each one was
verbally depicted as a superior achiever in one of three culturally
valued achievement categories: intellectual, social and physical.
Thus, the same three value categories were represented both in
the self-ideal discrepancy questionnaire and the experimental
stimulus complex (faces plus verbal descriptions)
. Each S made
three size-distance judgments on each stimulus at each of two
distances in a modified Ames Thereness-Thatness apparatus for a
total of 18 size-distance judgments per S (3 trials X 3 stimuli
X 2 stimulus distances - 18 size-distance judgments)
.
None of the hypotheses for main effects were statistically
confirmed. The means of the three self-ideal discrepancy groups
did, however, reflect the hypothesized trend that the high self-
ideal discrepant Ss would perceive the stimuli as larger and
closer than would the low self-ideal discrepant Ss. The main
effect for defensive mode also showed a consistent tendency for
the repressors to perceive the stimuli as larger and closer than
the sensitizers, and also to fluctuate more about their own
central tendency than did the sensitizers. These latter two
trends pertaining to defensive mode were tentatively explained
in terms of the greater suggestibility and lability of the re-
pressors as compared to the sensitizers. A tendency for the low
self-high ideal group to see the highest valued stimulus as
smallest and furthest away, rather than largest and closest as
was expected, was interpreted as a possible schizophrenic-like
"distancing 1 ’ response in an emotionally uncomfortable situation.
Finally, a decrease in the difference between the repressors and
the sensitizers at the far stimulus position relative to the near
was tentatively explained as a result of the reduced threat qual-
ity of the stimuli at the far position.
Methodological criticisms with respect to the self-ideal
discrepancy questionnaire, the Thereness-Thatness apparatus, and
the experimental stimuli were offered. Theoretical implications
and some possible extensions of this study were also discussed.
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APPENDIX A
Self..Ideal Discrepancy Questionnaire-Part A
SO
1. I am intelligent.
2. I make strong demands on myself.
3. I am often left out of group social activities.
4. I am a competitive person.
5. I am good at abstract reasoning.
6. I have good linguistic and mathematical abilities.
7. I don't care much for reading.
8. I have plenty of energy for strenuous physical activity.
9. I am an aloof reserved person.
10. I get along well with most people I meet.
11. I am a disciplined thinker.
12. It's difficult to control my aggression.
13. I am a social leader.
14. I am a good athlete.
15. I conduct myself smoothly at social functions such as dinner
parties, dances, dates, etc.
16. I express my emotions freely.
17. I am not interested in intellectual pursuits.
18. Most people like me.
19. I am good looking.
20. I am critical of people.
21. I am shy.
22. Clothes look well on me.
23. I have an underlying feeling that I'm not contributing enough to life.
24. I am at ease with new acquaintances.
25. I am confident about my physical appearance in social gatherings.
26. I often feel guilty.
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PART A
27. I am especially interested in improving my mind.
28. I don*t trust my emotions.
29. I feel tense and awkward at social gatherings.
30. I am very interested in learning about the ideas
great thinkers.
of the world*
s
31. I tire easily.
32. I have good manners.
33. I have an unattractive physique.
34. I am a rational person.
35. I feel uncomfortable with new acquaintances.
36. I am tolerant.
37. I can concentrate for long periods of time on a complex problem
38. I am a popular person.
39. I am poorly coordinated physically.
40. I feel inferior.
41. I am well coordinated, and have always performed well at such
physical activities as dancing or general athletics.
42. I do not find it difficult to interact with other people.
43. I have initiative.
44-. I am a deep thinker.
45. I am assertive.
46. I have good physical stamina.
47. I often feel lonely.
48. I am satisfied with myself.
49. I am well read.
50. I have a strong physique.
51. I am a poor athlete.
52. My ability to concentrate is poor.
PART A
82
53* I feel relaxed and nothing really bothers me.
5^. I fit easily into different kinds of social activities and am
rarely at a loss for company.
55* I am not particularly good looking.
56. Theoretical problems tend to confuse and bore me.
57. I often feel aggressive.
58. I am different from others.
59* I am not an intellectual person.
60. My height and my weight are just about right.
QUESTIONNAIRE—PART B
1. I am intelligent.
2. I have plenty of energy for strenuous physical activity.
3. I get along well with most people I meet.
My height and weight are just about right.
5. I have good linguistic and mathematical abilities.
6. I am a social leader.
7. I am a disciplined thinker.
8. I conduct myself well at social functions such as dinner parties,
dances, dates, etc.
9. I am a good athlete.
10. Most people like me.
11. I am good looking.
12. I am especially interested in improving my mind.
13. Clothes look well on me.
14. I am very interested in learning about the ideas of the world's
great thinkers.
15. I am at ease with new acquaintances.
16. I am confident about my appearance in social gatherings.
17. I am well read.
18. I have good manners.
19. I have a strong physique.
20. I fit easily into different kinds of social activities and
rarely am at a loss for company.
21. I am a deep thinker.
22. I do not find it difficult to interact with other people.
23. I have good physical stamina.
24. I am good at abstract reasoning.
25. I am well coordinated, and have always performed well at such
physical activities as dancing or general athletics.
26. I can concentrate for long periods of time on a complex problem.
27. I am a popular person.
ANSWER SHEET (PART A)
1
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Instructions for Actual Self
In evaluating the statements the first time, you should
continually bear in mind your ACTUAL SELF. This refers to your-
self as you feel you actually are . In reading each statement
repeat to yourself the thought: "As I see myself now..." With
this thought continually in mind, rank each statement as to how
much it applies to your actual self by assigning to it the appro-
priate number.
Numbers and their Designations :
1. applies hardly at all.
2. applies a little.
3. applies moderately.
4. applies a good deal.
5. applies very much.
ACTUAL SELF "As I see myself now..."
1 . 16. 31. 46.
2. 17. 32. 47.
3. 18. 33. 48.
4. 19. 34. *»9.
5. 20. 35. 50.
6. 21. 36. 51.
7. 22. 37. 52.
ACTUAL SELF "As I see myself now..."
8. 23. 38. 53.
9. 24. 39. 54.
10. 25. 40. 55.
11. 26. 41. 56.
12. 27. 42. 57.
13. 28 . 43. 58.
14. 29. hji 59.
15. 30. 45. 60
ANSWER SHEET (PART A)
2
Instructions for Ideal Self,Concept
In evaluating the statements the second time, you should
continually bear in mind your IDEAL SELF-CONCEPT. This refers
to yourself as you would like to be. In reading each statement
repeat to yourself the thought: ideally, I wish I could
honestly say..." With this thought continually in mind, rank
each statement as to how much it applies to your ideal self-
concept by assigning to it the appropriate number.
Numbers and their Designations
1. applies hardly at all.
2. applies a little.
3. applies moderately.
4. applies a good deal.
5. applies veiy much.
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IDEAL SELF-CONCEPT "Ideally I wish I could honestly say..."
1. 16. 31. 46.
2. 17. 32. 47.
3. 18. 33. 48.
4. 19. 34. 49.
5. 20. 35. 50.
6. 21. 36. 51.
7. 22. 37. 52.
IDEAL SELF-CONCEPT "Ideally I wish I could honestly
8. 23. 38. 53.
9. 24. 39. 54.
10. 25. 40. 55.
11. 26. 41. 56.
12. 27. 42. 57.
13. 28. 43. 58.
14. 29. 44. 59.
15. 30. 45.
60.
ANSWER SHEET (PART B)
2
sr>
Instructions for Value Hierarchy
On this part of the answer sheet, when evaluating the
"trios" of statements, you should continually bear in mind
your IDEAL SELF-CONCEPT. The thought, "Ideally I wish I
could honestly say...", should help you here also. Remember,
in each "trio" the statement applying most to your Ideal Self-
Concept gets a 1, the statement applying second best gets a 2,
and the one applying least gets a 3.
IDEAL SELF-CONCEPT
1 .
2 .
3 .
"Ideally I wish I could honestly say...."
16.
17 .
18 .
4 .
5 .
6
.
19 .
20 .
21 .
7 .
8 .
9 .
10 .
11 .
12 .
22 .
23 .
24
.
25 .
26.
27 .
13 .
14 .
15 .
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R-S Scale
1. I have a good appetite.
2. I wake up fresh and rested most mornings.
3. I am easily awakened by noise.
4. I like to read newspaper articles on crime.
5* My daily like is full of things that keep me interested.
6. I am about as able to work as I ever was.
7. There seems to be a lump in my throat much of the time.
8. I enjoy detective or mystery stories.
9* Once in a while I think of things too bad to talk about.
10. I am very seldom troubled by constipation.
11. At times I have fits of laughing and ciying that I cannot control.
12. I feel that it is certainly best to keep my mouth shut when
I'm in trouble.
13. I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job.
14. I seldom worry about my health.
15 . I have had periods of days, weeks, or months when I couldn't
take care of things because I couldn't "get going."
16. My sleep is fitful and disturbed.
17. I do not always tell the truth.
18. My judgment is better than it ever was.
19. 1 am in just as good physical health as most of ray friends.
20. I prefer to pass by school friends, or people I know but have
not seen for a long time, unless they speak to me first.
21. I am a good mixer.
22. Everything is turning out just like the prophets of the Bible
said it would.
.
I do not read every editorial in the newspaper every day.23
24 88I sometimes keep on at a thing until others lose their patience
with me.
25. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be.
26. I think a great many people exaggerate their misfortunes in
order to gain the sympathy and help of others.
27. I get angry sometimes.
28. Most of the time I feel blue.
29. I sometimes tease animals.
30. I am certainly lacking in self-confidence.
31* I usually feel that life is worth while.
32. Once in a while I put off until tomorrow what I ought to do today.
33. I think most people would lie to get ahead.
34. I do many things which I regret afterwards (I regret things more
or more often than others seem to).
35* I go to church almost every week.
36. I have very few quarrels with members of my family.
37 • I believe in the second coming of Christ.
38. My hardest battles are with myself.
39. I don't seem to care what happens to me.
40. Sometimes when I am not feeling well I am cross.
41. Much of the time I feel as if I have done something wrong or evil.
42. I am happy most of the time.
43. Some people are so bossy that I feel like doing the opposite of
what they request, even though I know they are right.
44. My table manners are not quite as good at home as when I am
out in company.
45. I seem to be about as capable and smart as most others around me.
46. Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain profit or an
advantage rather than to lose it.
47. Often I can't understand why I have been so cross and grouchy.
I have never vomited blood or coughed up blood.
^9 . I do not worry about catching diseases.
50 . At times my thoughts have raced ahead faster than I could speak
them.
51 • I could get into a movie without paying and be sure X was
not seen I would probably do it.
52. I commonly wonder what hidden reason another person may have for
doing something nice for me.
53 . Criticism or scolding hurts me terribly.
5^. My conduct is largely controlled by the customs of those about me.
55 • I certainly feel useless at times.
At times I feel like picking a fist fight with someone.
57 . I have often lost out on things because I couldn't make up my
mind soon enough.
58 . It makes me impatient to have people ask my advice or otherwise
interrupt me when I am working on something important.
59. I would rather win than lose in a game.
60. Most nights I go to sleep without thoughts or ideas bothering me.
61. During the past few years I have been well most of the time.
62. I have never had a fit or convulsion.
63. I am neither gaining nor losing weight.
64
.
I cry easily.
65. I cannot understand what I read as well as I used to.
66. I resent having anyone take me in so cleverly that I have had to
admit that it was one on me.
67. I like to study and read about things that I am working at.
68 . I like to know some important people because it makes me feel
important.
69. What others think of me does not bother me.
70 o It makes me uncomfortable to put on a stunt at a party even when
others are doing the same sort of things.
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^ frequently have to fight against showing that I am bashful.72.
My memory seems to be all right.
72.
73. I find it hard to make talk when X meet new people.
74. I am afraid of losing my mind.
75* I am against giving money to beggars.
76. I feel weak all over much of the time.
77 • Sometimes, when embarrassed, I break out in a sweat which annoys
me greatly.
78. I do not have spells of hay fever or asthma.
79. I do not like everyone I know.
80. I wish I were not so shy.
81. I enjoy many different kinds of play and recreation.
82. I like to flirt.
83. In walking I am very careful to step over sidewalk cracks.
84. I frequently find myself worrying about something.
85. I gossip a little at times.
86. I have at times stood in the way of people who were trying to do
something, not because it amounted to much but because of the
principle of the thing.
87. I get mad easily and then get over it soon.
88. I brood a great deal.
89. I have periods of such great restlessness that I cannot sit long
in a chair.
90. I dream frequently about things that are best kept to myself.
91. I believe I am no more nervous than most others.
92. Sometimes without any reason or even when things are going wrong
I feel excitedly happy, "on top of the world. 11
93. I can be friendly with people who do things which I consider wrong.
94. Sometimes at elections I vote for men about whom I know very little.
95 • I have difficulty in starting to do things.
96 . I sweat very easily even on cool days.
97. It is safer to trust nobody.
98. Once a week or oftener I become very excited.
99. When in a group of people I have trouble thinking of the right
things to talk about.
100. When I leave home I do not worry about whether the door is locked
and the windows closed.
101. I do not blame a person for taking advantage of someone who lays
himself open to it.
102. I have often felt that strangers were looking at me critically.
103. I drink an unusually large amount of water every day.
104. I am troubled by attacks of nausea and vomiting.
105 . I am always disgusted with the law when a criminal is freed
through the arguments of a smart lawyer.
106
. I work under a great deal of tension.
107. I am likely not to speak to people until they speak to me.
108. Life is a strain for me much of the time.
109. In school I found it very hard to talk before the class.
110. Even when I am with people I feel lonely much of the time.
111. I think nearly anyone would tell a lie to keep out of trouble.
112. I am easily embarrassed.
113. I worry over money and business.
114. I almost never dream.
115 . I easily become impatient with people.
116. I feel anxiety about something or someone almost all the time.
117. Sometimes I become so excited that I find it hard to get to sleep.
118. I forget right away what people say to me.
• I usually have to stop and think before I act even in trifling
matters.
119
120. Often I cross the street in order not to meet someone I see.
121. I often feel as if things were not real.
122. I have a habit of counting things that are not Important such
as bulbs on electric signs, and so forth.
123. I have strange and peculiar thoughts.
124. I get anxious and upset when I have to make a short trip away
from home.
125. I have been afraid of things or people that I knew could not
hurt me.
126. I have no dread of going into a room by myself where other people
have already gathered and are talking.
127. I have more trouble concentrating than others seem to have.
128. I have several times given up doing a thing because I thought too
little of my ability.
129. Bad words, often terrible words, come into my mind and I cannot
get rid of them.
130. Sometimes some unimportant thought will run through ray mind and
bother me for days.
131. Almost every day something happens to frighten me.
132. I am inclined to take things hard.
133. I am more sensitive than most other people.
134. At periods my mind seems to work more slowly than usual.
135* 1 very seldom have spells of the blues.
136. I wish I could get over worrying about things I have said that
may have injured other people’s feelings.
137. People often disappoint me.
138. I feel unable to tell anyone all about myself.
139. My plans have frequently seemed so full of difficulties that I
have had to give them up.
140. Often, even though everything is going fine for me, I feel that
I don't care about anything.
141. I have sometimes felt that difficulties were piling up so high
that I could not overcome them.
142. iiI often think, "I wish I were a child again.
143. I have often met people who were supposed to be experts who were
no better than I.
144. It makes me feel like a failure when I hear of the success of
someone I know well.
145. I am apt to take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put
them out of my mind.
146. At times I think I am no good at all.
147. I worry quite a bit over possible misfortunes.
1^8. I am apt to pass up something I want to do because others feel
that I am not going about it in the right way.
1^9. I find it hard to set aside a task that I have undertaken, even
for a short time.
150. I have several times had a change of heart about ray life work.
151. I must admit that I have at times been worried beyond reason over
something that really did not matter.
152. I like to let people know where I stand on things.
153* I have a daydream life about which I do not tell other people.
154. I have often felt guilty because I have pretended to feel more
sorry about something than I really was.
155. I feel tired a good deal of the time.
156. I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces.
APPENDIX C
General Instructions
This is an experiment in social perception. I am studying how
people see various other types of people. In the experiment you will
see the faces of three people who differ markedly in their interests
and abilities. They are seniors from a neighboring college, and they
recently appeared in their college newspaper which runs articles from
time to time on outstanding students. I am interested in an aspect of
your visual perception of them.
On successive trials these faces will be flashed in front of you
in the apparatus. Your job on each trial will be to estimate the
distance of the face by moving the white marker. You can move the
marker by turning the crank on your left. Specifically, the procedure
will be as follows. First, place your head in the head-rest and raise
the shield with your right hand. When I say "ready" drop the shield
and wait. After a short period of time I will flash one of the faces
in front of you for 4 seconds. When I say "set" move the marker to
where the face seemed to be. When you have made your setting say "OK"
to let me know you are done; then raise the shield and wait for the next
"ready" signal. There will be 18 trials with the faces. First, however,
we will do a few practice trials with the joker from a deck of playing
cards.
After Practice Trials
On the following trials, before I give you the ready signal, I will
mention some of the highlights of the newspaper article which appeared
about the student, giving you an idea of what he is like. Keep his
characteristics in mind as you view his face and make your setting.
Think of it as if you were actually seeing him in a darkened room.
On successive trials I will briefly remind you of what the person
is like. Any questions?
APPENDIX D
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Descriptive Paragraph for Intellectual Value Area
1. D. S. is one of the top students in his class. He has maintained
this position through out his college career. Although he is managing
editor of his campus newspaper and writes for the campus literary
magazine, he maintains a 3.7 Q. P. A. He is doing a senior honors
thesis this year, and next year he is going on to graduate school to
study for his doctor's degree. On the basis of his academic achieve-
ment he has been awarded a scholarship by the government to pay for
his graduate training. He is also a member of Phi Beta Kappa the
national honor society. D. S. is an exceptional scholar and un-
doubtedly has a bright professional future.
2. Now here's D. S. again, one of the top scholars in his class.
3. Here's D. S., the fellow with the 3»7 Q.P.A.
Here's D. S., he's the fellow who's doing the senior honors thesis.
5. Here's D. S. again, he's the fellow who's won a government scholarship
to study for his Ph.D.
6. Here's D. S. again, the Phi Beta Kappa scholar.
Descriptive Paragraph for Social Value Area
-• N. R. is one of the most popular people on his campus. He
immediately impresses one with his easy warmth and social poise.
He is president of the senior class, and he also held the office of
vice-president of his freshman class. He is a member of the
intrafratemity council on his campus, and he was largely respon-
sible for the planning and success of his college’s recent home-
coming weekend. He has been selected to appear in this year’s
edition of Who’s Who in American Colleges . Working with people
is his main interest, and next year he plans to go with General
Motors as a trainee in personnel management. Through out his
college career N. R. has been an outstanding organizer and student
leader.
2. Here’s N. R. again, the fellow with the easy warmth and social
poise.
3. This is N. R. , the president of his senior class.
4. Here's N. R. , the fellow who represents his fraternity on the
intra-fraternity council.
5. Now you’ll see N. R. again, the fellow who's been selected to appear
in Who’s Who in American Colleges .
6. Here's N. R0 , the outstanding organizer and social leader.
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Descriptive Paragraph for Physical Value Area
1. L. ¥. is the outstanding athlete of his class. He plays
varsity football and baseball and also runs for the winter track
squad. Last year he led his football team in scoring, and this
year he has given signs of repeating this performance by scoring
three touchdowns in the opening game of the season. In addition
to these varsity athletics L. W* is also an accomplished swimmer
and tennis player. He is also cadet colonel of the Air Force
ROTC on his campus. After graduation he intends to enter the
Air Force and become a career officer. He has been accepted
for jet-pilot training.
2. Now here's L. ¥.
,
the outstanding athlete.
3. Here's L. W. again, the fellow who plays varsity football and
baseball.
4. Here's L. ¥.
,
the fellow who scored three touchdowns in the
opening game of the season.
5. Here's L. W. again, the accomplished swimmer and tennis player.
6. This is L. ¥. again, the fellow who's been accepted for jet-pilot
training in the Air Force.
APPROVED:
(
y
d- C-y
OfJU'd
DATE: )^W^V /f6?>


